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COMMENT
'Til Death Do Us Part: New York's Slayer Rule
and In re Estates of Covert
JULIE J. OLENNt
INTRODUCTION
Edward Covert shot and killed his wife Kathleen on
April 3, 1998, committing suicide some three minutes later.'
The couple had jointly executed a will which provided that
the property of the first spouse to die would go to the
survivor and, upon the death of the survivor, in equal
proportions to the parents and siblings of each spouse? New
York's slayer rule, founded on general equitable maxims of
the common law, prohibits a slayer or his estate from
receiving any benefit from his victim's estate which would
accrue to him under the law of wills or intestacy.' In re
( J.D. candidate, State University of New York at Buffalo Law School, 2002.
Special thanks to Professor Kenneth Joyce for his encouragement and guidance,
and to Dennis Rosen for his extremely helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. In re Estates of Covert, 717 N.Y.S.2d 392, 394 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 2000),
leave to appeal granted, 751 N.E.2d 945 (N.Y. 2001). Oral argument was heard
by the New York Court of Appeals on October 17, 2001. See State of New York
Court of Appeals 2001 Court Calendar, http://vww.courts.state.ny.us/
ctapps/calendar.htm (last visited November 12, 2001).
2. Id. The will also made specific bequests to Kathleen's sister. See id.; see
also infra text accompanying note 103.
3. See, e.g., Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889) (slayer prohibited);
Bierbrauer v. Moran, 279 N.Y.S. 176 (App. Div. 1935) (prohibition extends to
slayer's estate). New York's slayer rule differs from that of most other
jurisdictions by remaining a creature of common rather than statutory law.
1341
1342 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49
Estates of Covert asked whether and how Edward's family
could succeed to their share of the couple's estates.4
Murder/suicide cases present a peculiar factual
situation for controversies involving the slayer rule,5
because the innocent distributees of the slayer may
generally make a derivative claim to the slayer's property
through the victim's estate, now as rightful beneficiaries of
the victim in place of the deceased slayer. The
circumstances of In re Estates of Covert present a further
complexity in that, under the jointly executed will, the
residuary beneficiaries of the slayer are identical to those of
the victim.6 The couple's estates could be distributed such
that the beneficiaries of the slayer would wind up in the
However, the principles underlying the common law rule are essentially the
same as those embodied in the statutory law of other jurisdictions. See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE § 43-8-253 (1991); ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.803 (Michie 2000); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2803 (West 1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-11-204 (Michie
1987); CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 250-258 (West 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-
803 (West 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-447 (West 1993); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 12, § 2322 (1995); D.C. CODE ANN. § 19-320 (1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
732.802 (West 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-4-6 (1997); HAw. REV. STAT. § 560:2-
803 (1993); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-803 (Michie 2001); 755 ILL. COmP. STAT. ANN.
5/2-6 (West 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-12.1 (Michie 2000); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 633.535 (West 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-513 (1994 & Supp. 2000); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 381.280 (Michie 1972); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 946 (West 2000);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-803 (West 1998); 1998 Mich. Legis. Serv. 386
(West) (to be codified at MICH. COmP. LAWS §§ 700.2802 to .2804); MINN. STAT. §
524.2-803 (1975 & Supp. 2001); MIss. CODE ANN. § 91-1-25 (1999); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 72-2-813 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2354 (1995); 1999 Nev. Stat. 323
(repealing NEV. REV. STAT. § 134.007 and adding a new chapter to be codified at
NEV. REV. STAT. tit. 3); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 3B:7-1 to 7-7 (West 1983); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 45-2-803 (Michie 2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 31A-3 to -11 (1999); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 30.1-10-03 (1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.19 (Anderson
1998); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 231 (West 1990); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 112.455 to
.55 (1999); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8801-8815 (West 1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 33-1.1-1 to 33-1.1-16 (1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-803 (Law Co-op. 1987);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-803 (Michie 2000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-1-106
(1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-803 (1998); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 551(6)
(1989); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-401 to -414 (Michie 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 11.84.010 to .900 (West 1998); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-4-2 (Michie 1997); WIS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 852.01, 854.14 (West 1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-14-101 (Michie
2001). See generally UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803 (amended 1997);
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 187 (1937).
4. 717 N.Y.S.2d at 394.
5. See, e.g., Luecke v. Mercantile Bank of Jonesboro, 691 S.W.2d 843 (Ark.
1985); Heinzman v. Mason, 694 N.E.2d 1164 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998); In re Estate
of Cox, 380 P.2d 584 (Mont. 1963); Bierbrauer v. Moran, 279 N.Y.S. 176 (App.
Div. 1935).
6. See infra text accompanying note 103.
NEW YORKS SLAYER RULE
same economic position they would have been in had the
killing not occurred.7 In such a case, while the slayer rule
will still apply, there may also be no reason to deny the
slayer's innocent distributees their shares from the victim's
estate.
This Comment criticizes Estates of Covert's application
of the slayer rule in the context of the couple's joint will and
argues that, had the slayer rule been properly applied,
there would have been ample reason in both law and equity
to deny Edward's family their share of Kathleen's estate.
More generally, this Comment argues that the common law
slayer rule requires the courts to reach questions of equity
through the rule's fundamental role in governing property
transfers at death by wrongful homicide. Part I reviews the
general development of the slayer rule and the principles
underlying it. Parts II and III outline the facts of the case
and the court's opinion. Part IV critiques the court's
application of the slayer rule and its consequent holding,
proposing an alternate analysis and distributional scheme.
This Comment concludes that the court's decision
undermines the equitable principles underlying New York's
slayer rule and the importance of the rule in facilitating the
distribution of victims' estates in accord with their intent.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Development of the Slayer Rule
At early common law, the potential problem of enabling
a slayer to profit from his wrongful act by succeeding to
property of his victim was addressed through the feudal
doctrines of attainder, forfeiture of estate, and corruption of
blood.9 In the United States, these feudal doctrines were
7. See In re Estates of Covert, 717 N.Y.S.2d at 394.
8. See generally Mary Louise Fellows, The Slayer Rule: Not Solely a Matter
of Equity, 71 IoWA L. REV. 489 (1986) (arguing that the slayer rule should be
recognized as integral to the regulation of property transfers, rather than as an
equitable appendage to the law of property).
9. See generally Alison Reppy, The Slayer's Bounty-History of Problem in
Anglo-American Law, 19 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 229 (1942) (discussing the common
law origins of the modem equitable doctrine). A person convicted of a felony was
deemed to be attainted at the time the sentence of death was pronounced; an
incident of attainder resulted in forfeiture of all lands and chattels, constituting
part of the felon's punishment. Id. at 231-33. Though the felon met with death,
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largely abolished by the states at their inception, and were
also prohibited under federal law. ° One of the first cases to
address the issues of whether and how to deny slayers the
benefits that would otherwise accrue to them via the law of
wills or intestate succession was the New York case of
Riggs v. Palmer."
In Riggs, the testator's grandson murdered the testator,
in order to accelerate his inheritance and prevent the
testator's planned revocation of the provision in his favor. 2
Riggs found the law-makers could not have intended-no
more than the testator-that such a case be comprehended
by their express language, 3 nor intended for it to be
governed by the letter rather than the spirit of the law.1"
The court ordered that "the devise and bequest in the will
to [the grandson] Elmer be declared ineffective to pass the
title to him... [and] that by reason of the crime of murder
committed upon the grandfather he is deprived of any
interest in the estate."5  Elmer was disqualified as
beneficiary under his grandfather's will, as well as an heir
in intestacy.'6 His share passed proportionately to the
the burden of attainder, corruption of blood, effectively was borne by his heirs,
who could not inherit from or through the attainted felon. Id. at 233.
10. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2 ("[N]o Attainder of Treason shall
work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture, except during the Life of the Person
attainted."). New York's analogous state statutory provision is N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS
LAW § 79-b (McKinney 1992) which reads, in relevant part: "A conviction of a
person for any crime, does not work a forfeiture of any property, real or
personal, or any right or interest therein."
11. 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889). As Professor Farber observes, "Itihe larger
question in Riggs was how courts and legislatures would relate to each other in
the coming age of statutes." Daniel A. Farber, Courts, Statutes, and Public
Policy: The Case of the Murderous Heir, 53 S.M.U. L. REV. 31 (2000). Riggs has
proved to be of longstanding relevance to jurisprudential scholars fascinated by
the respective roles of courts and legislatures in the search for and fashioning ofjustice. See, e.g., GUmo CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 5-
7 (1982); BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 40-43
(1921); RONALD DWORKiN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 23-39 (1977); RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 105-07 (1990).
12. 22 N.E. at 189.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. Id. at 191.
16. See id. at 190-91.
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testator's two daughters, subject to the support of Elmer's
mother during her lifetime.'
Riggs has been seen as a decision grounded in equity,18
standing for the proposition that slayers will not be
permitted to profit from their wrongful acts by succeeding
to the property of their victims. 9 The Riggs court distin-
guished the disqualification of Elmer as an heir or legatee
from an unlawful forfeiture of estate: disqualification "takes
from [the slayer] no property, but simply holds that he shall
not acquire property by his crime."" Riggs was seen by
17. Id. at 191. The daughters' interests were also subject to the support of
the testator's widow for her life, pursuant to the terms of an antenuptial
agreement. Id.
18. See CARDOZO, supra note 11, at 41 ("The logic of this [equitable] principle
prevailed over the logic of others.... One path was followed, another closed,
because of the conviction in the judicial mind that the one selected led to
justice.").
19. Riggs stressed that all laws "may be controlled in their operation and
effect by general fundamental maxims of the common law.... [such as] [n]o one
shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own
wrong... or to acquire property by his own crime." 22 N.E. at 190. The doctrine
of Riggs embodies a principle rather than a rule of law. See, e.g., CARDOZO,
supra note 11, at 41. Thus, it is entirely possible to legally profit from one's
legal wrongs, as in any case of adverse possession. See DWORKIN, supra note 11,
at 25. "A principle like 'No man may profit from his own wrong' does not even
purport to set out conditions that make its application necessary. Rather, it
states a reason that argues in one direction, but does not necessitate a
particular decision." Id. at 26; see also Anthony D'Amato, Elmer's Rule: A
Jurisprudential Dialogue, 60 IoWA L. REV. 1129 (1975) (arguing that law
includes general principles as well as explicit rules). But cf. Larry Alexander &
Ken Kress, Against Legal Principles, 82 IOWA L. REV. 739, 785 (1997) ("Legal
methodology requires only two types of norms: correct moral principles and
posited legal rules. It does not require legal principles.").
For inheritance law purposes, the slayer rule targets a victim's death at the
hands of her slayer as a circumstance in which "general laws passed for the
orderly, peaceable, and just devolution of property.... may be controlled in
their operation and effect" by the equitable principle. Riggs, 22 N.E. at 190; see
also Robin L. Preble, Family Violence and Family Property: A Proposal for
Reform, 13 J. LAW & INEQ. 401 (1995) (arguing that the moment of a victim's
death is an intolerably high threshold for forfeiture of an abuser's inheritance
rights, and proposing a statutory model for forfeiture of intestate succession
rights in domestic violence cases).
20. 22 N.E. at 190. Professor Fellows identifies the rationale used by Riggs
to establish the slayer rule as the "owned interest rationale": forfeiture is
constitutionally prohibited only as it applies to owned property, but not as
applied to property in which the slayer has only an expectancy interest. See
Fellows, supra note 8, at 540. However, the owned interest rationale is too
limited by half. The distinction "between owned property and property to be
acquired rests precariously on formalistic rules that should not be the basis for
constitutional distinctions." Id. at 540-43. Moreover, the owned interest
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courts in many jurisdictions as an instance of impermissiblejudicial legislation.2 Because the doctrines of forfeiture of
estate and corruption of blood had been abolished,2 slayers
early relied on prohibitions against those doctrines to argue
that the slayer rule was unconstitutional.2 Courts often had
difficulty distinguishing between forfeiture through
application of the slayer rule and constitutionally
prohibited forfeiture situations.24
rationale does not speak to the corruption of blood doctrine, which denies heirs
their expectancy interests.
The less common "confiscation rationale" holds that the unconstitutional
doctrines of forfeiture and corruption of blood pertain only to the state's taking
of property, and not to alternate dispositions of property to private citizens. See
Fellows, supra note 8, at 540. For a criticism of the confiscation rationale, see
id. at 542-44.
21. E.g., Shellenberger v. Ransom, 59 N.W. 935, 941 (Neb. 1894); In re
Estate of Carpenter, 32 A. 637, 637 (Pa. 1895); McAllister v. Fair, 84 P. 112,
114-15 (Kan. 1906); Hagan v. Cone, 94 S.E. 602, 603-04 (Ga. Ct. App. 1917).
Contra Riggs, 22 N.E. 188; Perry v. Strawbridge, 108 S.W. 641 (Mo. 1908).
Notably, both New York and Missouri, which early adopted the slayer rule into
common law, have not enacted a comprehensive slayer statute. But ef N.Y. EST.
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.6 (McKinney 1998) (disqualifying a joint tenant
convicted of murder in the first or second degree from entitlement to any
monies in a joint bank account except for those contributed by him).
22. See supra note 10.
23. See, e.g., Box v. Lanier, 79 S.W. 1042, 1047 (Tenn. 1903); Perry v.
Strawbridge, 108 S.W. at 648; Price v. Hitaffer, 165 A. 470, 471 (Md. 1933);
Weaver v. Hollis, 22 So.2d 525, 529 (Ala. 1945); Nat'l City Bank v. Bledsoe, 144
N.E.2d 710, 716 (Ind. 1957); Moore v. Moore, 168 S.E.2d 318, 320-21 (Ga. 1969);
see also RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 187 cmt. c (1937). See generally Fellows,
supra note 8, at 538-45 (discussing the constitutional dimensions of the slayer
rule).
One argument for distinguishing the lawfulness of the slayer rule from the
constitutional prohibitions against forfeiture of estate and corruption of blood is
that the latter are based on the criminal status of the slayer, and are imposed
as criminal penalties. A conviction is not required in New York for application
of the slayer rule, so long as the homicide was intentional. See, e.g., In re Estate
of Bobula, 227 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1967); In re Estate of Liebman, 523 N.Y.S.2d 737
(Sur. Ct. 1987). For a general discussion of the necessity or sufficiency of a
criminal conviction in slayer cases, and the standards of evidence sufficient in
civil law cases under state slayer rules, see Jeffrey G. Sherman, Mercy Killing
and the Right to Inherit, 1993 U. CINN. L. REV. 803, 848-56 (1993).
24. The slayer rule is not based on the slayer's criminal status, but rather
on his wrongful acts. See Fellows, supra note 8, at 544-45; Sherman, supra note
23, at 859-60; see also In re Estate of Macaro, 699 N.Y.S.2d 634, 638 n.3 (Sur.
Ct. 1999) (discussing New York cases in which the slayer rule was or was not
applied, based on the presence or absence, respectively, of a culpable mental
state). Its purpose is to promote "the orderly, peaceable, and just devolution of
property." Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (N.Y. 1889). See generally Fellows,
supra note 8 (arguing that the slayer rule is not merely equitable, but integral
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Most jurisdictions have responded to these problems by
enacting statutes that bar slayers from succeeding to their
victims' property.25 However, Riggs found that enacting a
slayer statute had not then been deemed necessary in any
common law jurisdiction because "the maxims of the
common law were sufficient to regulate such a case."26 The
New York slayer rule today is still almost exclusively a
matter of common law." It continues to be the position of
New York that an equitable construction28 of the laws of
to an efficient property transfer system). Moreover, the sanction imposed on the
slayer depends on the value of the property involved, not the heinousness of the
slayer's act. See Sherman, supra note 23, at 859-60 ("A brutal premeditated
slaying of a penniless ancestor brings about no penalty under the slayer rule,
while the voluntary or even involuntary manslaughter of a rich uncle may visit
a sizeable penalty upon the nephew.").
If forfeitures imposed by the slayer rule are based on the criminal act and
not on criminal status, such forfeitures should be beyond the reach of federal
and analogous state constitutional prohibitions against forfeiture of estate and
corruption of blood. See Fellows, supra note 8, at 544-45. Certainly, such
prohibitions have not placed significant constraints on state power to design
and impose a slayer rule by statute, or under common law. Professor Fellows
argues that the slayer rule, understood as a rule regulating property transfers,
is merely a socioeconomic regulation. Id. at 545; cf., e.g., 20 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 8815 (West 1975) ("This chapter [slayer statute] shall not be considered
penal in nature, but shall be construed broadly in order to effect the policy of
this State that no person shall be allowed to profit by his own wrong, wherever
committed."). Thus, if a forfeiture pursuant to a state slayer statute were to be
challenged under the Due Process or Equal Protection clauses of the U.S.
Constitution, courts would presumably evaluate the constitutional claim using
the minimum rationality standard, and likely would defer to legislative
judgment. See Fellows, supra note 8, at 545.
25. See supra note 3; Sherman, supra note 23, at 847; see also Farber, supra
note 11 (discussing the continuing relevance and use of the equitable doctrine to
fill gaps in existing statutory slayer law).
26. 22 N.E. at 190.
27. The single statutory appendage to the slayer rule in New York is
dramatically under-inclusive of the types of perpetrators and property interests
otherwise encompassed by the common law rule. See N.Y. EST. POWERS &
TRUSTS LAw § 4-1.6 (McKinney 1998) (disqualifying a joint tenant convicted of
murder in the first or second degree from entitlement to any monies in a joint
bank account except for funds contributed by him).
28. The concept of what equity requires and, thus, what is an equitable
construction may well change over time. See, e.g., Sams v. Sams' Admr., 3 S.W.
593 (Ky. 1887) (holding that a statute which deemed legitimate any child
conceived out of wedlock if the parents later married and the father recognized
paternity could not be construed to include children of an adulterous
intercourse). Arguably, New York has failed to enact a comprehensive slayer
statute not merely because Riggs found such legislation unnecessary, but
because Riggs is viewed favorably as "an outstanding example of judicial
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succession is sufficient to ameliorate the consequences of an
intentional killing." Consistent with the equitable doctrine
of Riggs, the rule has been found applicable to the slayer's
estate as well as the slayer."0 The slayer is thereby denied
the intangible benefit of being enabled to control the
ultimate disposition of his victim's property through his
own estate plan.3'
The rule has also been found applicable to property held
by the slayer and his victim with a right of survivorship."
For property held with a right of survivorship," the rule
precludes the slayer or his estate from asserting
survivorship in order to receive any part of his victim's
property. 4 To serve this end, courts have employed the use
of a legal fiction that the slayer predeceased his victim:
In contemplation of law and in respect of all property benefits
arising from his victim's estate, it must always be presumed by the
court that the victim outlived the killer. This fiction can be
indulged so that the crime of felonious killing is set at naught so
far as it is humanly possible to accomplish that result. But aside
from this concept of survivorship, the argument is fully met by the
ruling in Riggs v. Palmer.35
B. Principles Supporting the Slayer Rule
Principles of morality, equity, and property law form
the basis of policy interests supporting the slayer rule."6
activism." In re Estates of Dorsey, 613 N.Y.S.2d 335, 338 (Sur. Ct. 1994). See
generally Farber, supra note 11.
29. See In re Estate of Sparks, 15 N.Y.S.2d 926, 931 (Sur. Ct. 1939).
30. E.g., Logan v. Whitley, 114 N.Y.S. 255 (App. Div. 1908); Van Alstyne v.
Tufty, 169 N.Y.S. 173 (Sup. Ct. 1918).
31. See Bierbrauer v. Moran, 279 N.Y.S. 176, 179 (App. Div. 1935); In re
Estate of Sparks, 15 N.Y.S.2d at 931; ef Petrie v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 307
N.E.2d 253 (N.Y. 1973) (holding that a slayer's nominee may not succeed to the
remainder of an inter vivos trust).
32. E.g., In re Estate of Pikul, 601 N.Y.S.2d 113 (App. Div. 1993); In re
Estates of Pinnock, 371 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Sur. Ct. 1975).
33. See, e.g., In re Estate of Mathew, 706 N.Y.S.2d 432 (App. Div. 2000)
(tenancy by the entirety); In re Estate of Nicpon, 424 N.Y.S.2d 100 (Sur. Ct.
1980) (tenancy by the entirety); Bierbrauer v. Moran, 279 N.Y.S. 176 (jointly
held properties with and without right of survivorship); In re Estate of Bobula,
19 N.Y.2d 818 (App. Div. 1966) (joint tenancy with right of survivorship).
34. Bierbrauer, 279 N.Y.S. at 179.
35. In re Estate of Sparks, 15 N.Y.S.2d 926, 931 (Sur. Ct. 1939).
36. See Adam J. Katz, Comment, Heinzman v. Mason: A Decision Based in
Equity but Not an Equitable Decision, 13 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 441, 450-56
(1999).
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These principles inform the methods fashioned by courts
and legislatures to _revent slayers from benefitting from
their wrongful acts."The moral justification for denying
slayers the right to succeed to their victims' property varies
widely with the circumstances. In cases where the killing is
motivated by greed, we have ample moral reason to apply
the slayer rule, and a clear view of the killer as undeserving
of the benefit that the laws of property would otherwise
give him."S Where the killing is motivated by mercy and
done at the request of a terminally ill victim, the moral
justification-along with the undeserving status of the
slayer-is less clear.39 In cases of murder/suicide, the moral
justification is again unclear, because the rule is extended
to affect the slayer's distributees. ° In such cases, "[t]he best
reason to deny the property to the distributees of a slayer's
estate is to prevent the undeserving slayer from controlling
the disposition of the victim's property through deathtime
transfers."4
The equitable justification for the slayer rule reflects a
policy judgment that "the social interest served by refusing
37. The moral and equitable justifications for New York's "Son of Sam" law
are arguably similar to those underlying the slayer rule, but the analogy stops
short at the property law justification. See N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 632-a (McKinney
1998) ("Son of Sam" law aims to prevent a criminal who economically profits
from exploiting the notoriety of his crime from reaping a windfall at his victim's
expense by requiring proceeds be paid into escrow as a source of funds to
compensate victims who are successful in a cause of action against the
criminal); N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd. v. T.J.M. Prods., Inc., 705 N.Y.S. 320,
321 (App. Div. 2000) (discussing history and varying success of "Son of Sam"
law's attempt to take the profit out of crime and pass constitutional muster).
The original "Son of Sam" law was successfully challenged as unconstitutional
on First Amendment grounds, see Simon & Schuster v. Members of N.Y. State
Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991), but the current law has not yet been so
tested. See T.J.M. Prods., 705 N.Y.S. at 324-26.
38. For an overview of state slayer statutes and the types of homicides
covered by different statutory formulations, see Sherman, supra note 23, at 848-
51. "The most common statutory formulation is 'felonious and intentional.' " Id.
at 848; cf Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 191 (N.Y. 1889) ("wvillfully and
intentionally"). See generally Fellows, supra note 8, at 496-504 (arguing that the
slayer rule should extend to only felonious and intentional killings).
39. See Sherman, supra note 23, at 856-77 (arguing for and proposing a
statutory model to except slayers who assist suicide from the slayer rule); see
also Kent S. Berk, Comment, Mercy Killing and the Slayer Rule: Should the
Legislatures Change Something?, 67 TUL. L. REV. 485 (1992).
40. See, e.g., Price v. Hitaffer, 165 A. 470, 471-73 (Md. 1933); Perry v.
Strawbridge, 108 S.W. 641, 648 (Mo. 1908); In re Estate of Cox, 380 P.2d 584
(Mont. 1963); Bierbrauer v. Moran, 279 N.Y.S. 176 (App. Div. 1935).
41. Fellows, supra note 8, at 495.
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to permit the criminal to profit by his crime is greater than
that served by the preservation of legal rights of
ownership."" e  Equity intervenes to combat unjust
enrichment as well as to -penalize" or deter 45 those who
would injure the public.4 The equitable principle as
articulated in Riggs does not require inquiry into the
murderer's motive in applying the slayer rule,47 thus
encompassing situations in which the slayer is greatly more
or less morally culpable.4"
The property law justification for the slayer rule reflects
Riggs's observation that the rule is necessary for the
"orderly, peaceable, and just devolution of property."49 Else,
the property transfer system would potentially be disrupted
by depriving the victim of the opportunity to make an
alternate estate plan, or by allowing the slayer's act to
determine survivorship, or both." The property transfer
thesis also highlights the danger in relying on the equitable
principle alone to effect fair and efficient property transfers:
It must first be determined what types of property interests
42. John W. Wade, Acquisition of Property by Willfully Killing Another-A
Statutory Solution, 49 HARV. L. REV. 715, 715-16 (1936).
43. See Logan v. Whitley, 114 N.Y.S. 255 (App. Div. 1908).
44. The penalty imposed is not a retributive punishment, such as forfeiture
of estate or escheat, which would directly punish innocent distributees of the
slayer. See Sherman, supra note 23, at 873; see also Fellows, supra note 8, at
544 ("Just as the forfeiture prescribed by criminal fines is not designed to
confiscate all the criminal's wealth, the forfeiture prescribed under the slayer
rule is determined by the property's relationship to the victim and does not
affect property otherwise owned by the slayer.").
45. The slayer rule may have a deterrent effect on those who would murder
for profit. See Sherman, supra note 23, at 873-74. An ancillary deterrent effect
may result, in that the slayer rule serves as further notice that a slaying is a
wrong against the public which may carry civil as well as criminal law
consequences. See id. Certainly, deterrence is a legitimate goal of the civil as
well as the criminal law.
46. See Katz, supra note 36, at 451-52.
47. See Van Alstyne v. Tufty, 169 N.Y.S. 173 (Sup. Ct. 1918).
48. See id. The slayer rule may apply to an assisted suicide, which is a
felonious and intentional killing in New York. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15(3)
(McKinney 1998). However, the New York rule does not apply where the killer
acts in self-defense, see In re Barrett, 637 N.Y.S.2d 751 (1996), or under a
disability, such as insanity, sufficient to negate a culpable mental state. See In
re Wirth, 298 N.Y.S.2d 565 (Sur. Ct. 1969).
49. Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (N.Y. 1889).
50. See Fellows, supra note 8, at 504. The system is also disrupted because
the victim loses personal enjoyment of the property through the slayer's act,
although this is not an effect of the slaying which the law can ameliorate. See
id.
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should be denied the slayer before it can be determined
whether the slayer is benefitted for the purpose of applying
equitable principles."
Every U.S. jurisdiction has chosen to grant a right to
bequeath or inherit, though the federal Constitution does
not bestow such rights, nor prohibit a state from limiting,
conditioning, or denying them altogether. 2 Although the
slayer's act is wrongful, it is offensive from the standpoint
of property law only because it "frustrate[s] intentions we
are otherwise disposed to honor."5 Here, equity and
property law intersect: The slayer rule preserves for a
victim the intent the law chooses to honor, in the first
instance, by bestowing upon her the right to dispose of her
property at death however she sees fit. "[T]he rule is
designed to preserve the integrity of our property-transfer
system by preventing a person from altering, by means of a
wrongful slaying, the course of property succession as
intended by the source of the property."54 Though the law
cannot completely rectify the harm caused by the killing,
the goal in slayer cases is not merely to prevent the slayer
from succeeding to his victim's estate, but efficiently to
distribute the victim's property in accord with her intent, as
best as possible as though the killing had not occurred.5
II. FACTS
On April 3, 1998, Edward Covert stalked his wife
Kathleen and killed her by shooting her three times at close
range." Some few minutes later, Edward committed suicide
51. See In re Estate of Mathew, 706 N.Y.S.2d 432 (App. Div. 2000); see also
Fellows, supra note 8. Professor Fellows argues:
[If the victim did not have the power to change the estate plan and if
the property interest [at issue] was not conditioned on the slayer
surviving the victim, then the slayer does not benefit from the victim's
death and the equitable maxim should not be the basis for the
forfeiture.
Id. at 505.
52. See Sherman, supra note 23, at 862.
53. Id. at 861.
54. Id. at 860 (emphasis added); see also infra Part IV.D.
55. See In re Estate of Sparks, 15 N.Y.S.2d 926 (Sur. Ct. 1939). See generally
Fellows, supra note 8.
56. Petitioner's Statement in Support of Motion for Permission to Appeal at
5, In re Estates of Covert, 717 N.Y.S.2d 392 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 2000) (No. 98-
0329). Kathleen had left the couple's Binghamton, N.Y. home after a domestic
dispute five days before her death; Edward tracked her down near a friend's
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by turning the gun on himself.7 The couple had jointly
executed a will in 1995 which provided that, upon the death
of the first spouse, the surviving sgouse would succeed to all
the property of the first to die. Upon the death of the
surviving spouse, some specific property would pass to
Kathleen's sister, with the balance of the estate to pass one-
third to each spouse's parents, the remaining third to be
evenly divided between the couple's siblings.5 The couple's
assets included property held as joint tenants with right of
survivorship as well as some separate property of each
spouse.60
The Surrogate's Court of Broome County issued letters
testamentary in both estates to Kathleen's sister, who then
requested direction in distribution of the estates.6' Edward's
family, the Coverts, filed an answer demanding equal
distribution of both estates under the terms of the couple's
will.6 '2 Kathleen's family, the Millards, answered and
demanded distribution of Kathleen's estate to them only.
6 1
The Millards requested that Kathleen's estate pass under
the laws of intestacy or, alternatively, under the will to
distributees other than Edward or his family.64 The Coverts
then moved for summary judgment.5 The court denied the
home in Pennsylvania, where he shot her, and then himself. See State of New
York Court of Appeals, Case Summary No. 154 (argued Oct. 17, 2001), at
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ctapps/calendar.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2001).
57. In re Estates of Covert, 717 N.Y.S.2d at 394.
58. Id.; see also infra text accompanying note 103.
59. In re Estates of Covert, 717 N.Y.S.2d at 394. Edward was survived by
both parents and by three sisters ("the Coverts"); Kathleen was survived by
Edward for three minutes and, excluding Edward, her parents, a brother and a
sister ("the Millards"). In re Will of Covert, No. 98-329, at 2 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. Dec.
16, 1999).
60. In re Will of Covert, No. 98-329, at 2. The couple held approximately
$120,500 as joint tenants with right of survivorship; the two estates totaled
approximately $417,000, with assets comprising the larger part of the balance
in Kathleen's name. Id.
61. In re Estates of Covert, 717 N.Y.S.2d at 394.
62. Id.
63. See id. Both the Surrogate Court's opinion and that of the Third
Department erroneously indicate that the Millards demanded the assets of both
estates be distributed only to them. See Petitioner's Statement in Support of
Motion for Permission to Appeal at 7, In re Estates of Covert, 717 N.Y.S.2d 392
(App. Div. 2000) (No. 98-0329).
64. Petitioner's Statement in Support of Motion for Permission to Appeal at
7, In re Estates of Covert, 717 N.Y.S.2d 392 (App. Div. 2000) (No. 98-0329).
65. In re Estates of Covert, 717 N.Y.S.2d at 394.
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Coverts' motion, and granted summary judgment in favor of
the Millards.66
Applying the doctrine of Riggs v. Palmer,67  the
Surrogate's Court held that Edward had forfeited any right
to the couple's joint assets." The couple's jointly held
property as well as Kathleen's separate property passed to
her estate.69 Taking into account evidence that Kathleen
intended to change her will before her untimely death, and
stating that it was likely the couple's joint will was
executed as a quid pro quo of their marital relationship
rather than out of an intentional desire to benefit their
respective in-laws, the court held that Riggs also required a
forfeiture of any of the Covert family's interest in
Kathleen's estate. 0
The court found that disqualifying the Coverts was
dictated by the equitable doctrine of Riggs,7 and the duty
thereby imposed on courts to ensure that testators may
"dispose of their estates to the objects of their bounty at
death."" The court ordered that half Kathleen's estate
passed under her will to her parents, the other half to her
siblings.73 Finally, the court held that Edward's separate
property-including proceeds from his life insurance
policies and a retirement fund-passed to his estate to be
distributed half to each family under his will.74 Though
Edward's insurance policies and retirement fund named his
66. Id.
67. 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889).
68. In re Will of Covert, No. 98-329, at 6 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. Dec. 16, 1999).
69. Id. The court implicitly held that a forfeiture of Edward's right to the
couple's jointly held property required a forfeiture of his own undivided interest.
See id. (citing In re Estate of Pikul, 601 N.Y.S.2d 113 (App. Div. 1993)).
70. See In re Will of Covert, No. 98-329, at 5-6.
71. Id. at6.
72. Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. at 189.
73. In re Will of Covert, No. 98-329, at 9. The presumption where a decedent
has executed a will is that she did not intend to die intestate with respect to any
part of her estate. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAw § 3-3.1 (McKinney
1998). New York courts have generally upheld this presumption in slayer cases.
See, e.g., In re Estates of Dorsey, 613 N.Y.S.2d 335 (Sur. Ct. 1994). But cf. In re
Will of Byers, 144 N.Y.S.2d 68 (Sur. Ct. 1955) (allowing property to go by
intestacy where disposition to alternative beneficiaries under murder victim's
will would deprive innocent distributees of a share in victim's estate). Had the
Surrogate's Court instead determined that Kathleen Covert died intestate as to
all or part of her estate then, under N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAw § 4-
1.(a)(4), her parents would be her sole distributees in place of Edward. See also
infra note 123.
74. See In re Will of Covert, No. 98-329, at 8-9.
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parents as alternate beneficiaries in the event of Kathleen's
predecease, the court found that they were payable to
Edward's estate because the proceeds "would have
rightfully belonged to Kathleen had not Edward murdered
his wife before committing suicide."Y The Coverts appealed.
III. OPINION
The Appellate Division, Third Department, began its
analysis as did the Surrogate's Court. Relying on Riggs v.
Palmer and its progeny, '6 the court held that "[blecause this
doctrine [that a slayer is not entitled to profit from the
death of the victim] is as applicable to the slayer's estate as
it is to the slayer, the property of the victim may not pass to
the slayer's estate."" The court found that employing a legal
fiction that Edward had predeceased Kathleen was a
legitimate means 8 to prevent his estate from profiting from
the murder. 9 However, the court stated that it would be
"err[or] in the context of this will [to] limit[] the fiction to
certain types of property."" Instead, the court found it
proper "under the particular circumstances of this couple's
joint will... [to] giv[e the wife], as the fictitious survivor,
all the property of the first to die.""1 The court further held
that the Surrogate's Court erred in "disqualifying the
Coverts from taking the share of the wife's estate they
75. Id.; cf Petrie v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 307 N.E.2d 253 (N.Y. 1973)
(remainder interest in victim's inter vivos trust cannot pass to slayer's
nominee).
76. See 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889); see also In re Bach, 383 N.Y.S.2d 653 (App.
Div. 1976); Bierbrauer v. Moran, 279 N.Y.S. 176 (App. Div. 1935) (rule
applicable to slayer's estate as well as slayer); In re Jacobs, 154 N.Y.S.2d 536
(App. Div. 1956).
77. In re Estates of Covert, 717 N.Y.S.2d 392, 394 (App. Div. 2000).
78. See id. at 395. The Third Department stated that the Surrogate had
utilized the fiction in directing that the jointly held property as well as
Kathleen's individually owned property passed to her estate. See id. at 394.
However, the Surrogate Court's opinion does not refer at all to the use of a legal
fiction to achieve its result. See In re Will of Covert, No. 98-329. The use of the
fiction with respect to Kathleen's separate property is simply unnecessary
under Riggs v. Palmer, which straightforwardly denied the slayer any right to
the testator's property. See 22 N.E. at 191; see also In re Estate of Sparks, 15
N.Y.S.2d 926, 931 (Sur. Ct. 1939) (holding that the fiction is necessary only to
defeat the slayer's claim to property held with right of survivorship).
79. In re Estates of Covert, 717 N.Y.S.2d at 394.
80. Id. (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 394-95 (emphasis added).
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otherwise would have received as her beneficiaries" under
the couple's joint will.82
The court held that by "consistently" applying the
fiction that the slayer had predeceased his victim-so as to
include in Kathleen's estate her slayer's separate property
as well as those the couple held jointly-Kathleen's
testamentary scheme would be honored by giving her all
the property of the first to die.83 The court acknowledged
that the fiction of predecease would generally not apply to
Edward's separate property, because the doctrine that a
wrongdoer may not profit from his misdeed should not work
a forfeiture of the wrongdoer's own property.84 However, the
court reasoned that no forfeiture was worked by extending
the fiction to Edward's separate property "under these
circumstances, because the Coverts will share in the same
proportions as beneficiaries of the wife as they would have
as beneficiaries of the husband.""
The Coverts, themselves innocent of Edward's
wrongdoing, could claim their full share of the couple's
property as rightful beneficiaries of the victim, rather than
the slayer." The equitable doctrine "would not disqualify
them from receiving the shares of the wife's estate as
contemplated in her will."87 More importantly, the court
explained, such a distribution would carry out Kathleen's
intention, as contemplated in the joint will, to benefit the
Millards and Coverts in equal proportion." However, in
82. Id. at 394.
83. See id. at 395.
84. Id.; cf Riggs, 22 N.E. at 190 (the rule "takes from [the slayer] no
property, but simply holds that he shall not acquire property by his crime, and
thus be rewarded for its commission"); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-b (McKinney
1992) (all forfeitures of property on conviction of crime abolished).
85. In re Estates of Covert, 717 N.Y.S.2d at 395 (emphasis added).
86. The circumstances of murder/suicide cases frequently result in innocent
distributees of the slayer asserting a claim against the estate of the victim. See,
e.g., Luecke v. Mercantile Bank of Jonesboro, 691 S.W.2d 843 (Ark. 1985);
Heinzman v. Mason, 694 N.E.2d 1164 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998); In re Estate of Cox,
380 P.2d 584 (Mont. 1963); Bierbrauer v. Moran, 279 N.Y.S. 176 (App. Div.
1935). The slayer rule is typically not extended to persons who take directly
from the victim's estate, even where they are also natural objects of the slayer's
bounty. See, e.g., In re Estates of Dorsey, 613 N.Y.S.2d 335 (Sur. Ct. 1994). See
generally Fellows, supra note 8, at 494-96, 523-35 (discussing reasons offered by
courts and commentators for not disqualifying innocent distributees of the
slayer).




determining that such was Kathleen's intention, the court
relied exclusively on the provision in the couple's will which
was to dispose of the survivor's estate.89
The court also noted an apparent conflict of authority
among New York appellate jurisdictions concerning the
extent of the slayer's interest, and therefore forfeiture of
rights, in jointly held property with right of survivorship."
However, the court reasoned that, in this case, there could
be no forfeiture of Edward's interest in the couple's jointly
held property."1 The Coverts would take, through Kathleen
(as fictitious survivor), any rights of Edward's.92 Thus,
under its holdings as to both survivorship and
distribution,93 the court found it unnecessary to determine
the extent to which the slayer could rightfully be denied an
interest in jointly held property under the slayer rule.94
Finally, the court held that the Surrogate's Court erred
in directing that the proceeds of Edward's life insurance
policies and retirement fund be paid to his estate rather
than to the designated alternate beneficiaries-his father
and parents, respectively.95 Edward had the unrestricted
right during his life to name or change the beneficiaries on
each of these assets.96 The court held that because he had a
unilateral right to name or change the beneficiaries at any
89. Because these beneficiaries could take any property rightfully retained
by Edward's estate under the slayer rule, the intention the court appears to rely
on as "more importantly" fulfilled by its ruling is that Kathleen receive, as
(fictitious) survivor, all rights to the couple's property held by the (fictitious)
predeceased. See id.
90. See id. at 395 n.1. The First and Fourth Departments have held that the
slayer forfeits all rights in property held jointly with right of survivorship,
including the slayer's undivided half interest. See In re Estate of Pikul, 601
N.Y.S.2d 113 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1993); In re Estate of Bobula, 269 N.Y.S.2d
599 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1966); Bierbrauer v. Moran, 279 N.Y.S. 176 (App. Div.
4th Dep't 1935). The Second Department has held that the slayer does not
forfeit his undivided one half interest in property held as tenants by the
entirety. See In re Estate of Mathew, 706 N.Y.S.2d 432 (App. Div. 2d Dep't
2000). This is an apparent split only, as the unilateral right to severance of
jointly held property, importantly, distinguishes it from a tenancy by the
entirety. See In re Estates of Pinnock, 371 N.Y.S.2d 797, 801 (Sur. Ct. 1975); see
also infra note 215.
91. In re Estates of Covert, 717 N.Y.S.2d at 395.
92. Id. at 395 n.1.
93. See id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 395.
96. Id.
1356 [Vol. 49
NEW YORK'S SLAYER RULE
time and without any wrongful act, the proceeds were
payable directly to Edward's alternate beneficiaries.
97
IV. ANALYSIS
The singularly unfortunate facts of this case-the
suicide of Edward immediately following his murder of
Kathleen, in addition to the couple's jointly executed will-
enabled the Third Department to decide the case without
sufficient regard for either the circumstances that rendered
the slayer rule applicable, or the testamentary scheme to
which it applied. Though the court held, consistent with the
equitable doctrine, that Kathleen's assets could not pass to
the Coverts and Millards through Edward's estate, it never
questioned whether the murder and Kathleen's factual
predecease had any collateral impact on either her or
Edward's testamentary scheme. Yet, because Kathleen was
murdered by her husband, she was in fact the first to die.9"
A distribution of the estate to the couple's families was the
testamentary scheme proposed for the survivor.
Significant questions of law arise "in the context of this
will,"9 - which conditioned the Coverts' taking through
Kathleen on her survivorship of Edward. The answers to
these questions would have affected the ultimate
distribution of the couple's estates, in contrast to the Third
Department's holding. The court failed to recognize that the
joint will, no less than the homicide, had an impact on the
issues presented in this case. As a result, the court's
holding effectively undermined the purpose of the slayer
rule to effect the "orderly, peaceable, and just devolution of
property."100
97. See id. In holding that the proceeds were payable to Edward's estate
rather than to his alternate beneficiaries, the Surrogate's Court had relied on
Petrie v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 307 N.E.2d 253 (N.Y. 1973), in which it was
held that a slayer's nominee could not succeed to the remainder interest of an
inter vivos trust established by the victim. See In re Will of Covert, No. 98-329,
at 7-8 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. Dec. 16, 1999). The Third Department distinguished the
instant case, where Edward was the sole owner of the property in question. See
In re Estates of Covert, 717 N.Y.S.2d at 395.
98. In re Estates of Covert, 717 N.Y.S.2d at 394.
99. Id. (emphasis added).
100. Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (N.Y. 1889) (emphasis added); see
also Fellows, supra note 8 (arguing that the slayer rule is integral to property
transfer law).
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A. Operation of Jointly-Executed Wills
Under New York law, a jointly-executed will operates
as the separate will of whomever dies first."' If the will
undertakes to dispose of the property of the survivor as well
as the first to die, it is effective as the will of the survivor
only in the absence of a later will by him.' The will
executed by Edward and Kathleen read, in relevant part:
SECOND: Upon the death of one of us leaving the other of us
surviving, all the property and estate of every kind and nature
wheresoever situate, of the one so dying first of which he or she
has the power of disposal, is hereby given, devised and bequeathed
to the survivor absolutely and without any limitation or restriction
whatsoever....
FIFTH: Upon the death of the survivor of us we bequeath our time
share condominium... and jewelry to Kathleen's sister, Kelly
Hawley; if Kelly Hawley should predecease us, then to her
children then living; if she dies with no living children, then to
Theresa Guinan, sister of Edward. If both these individuals should
predecease the survivor of us, then those items shall go into our
residuary estate to be divided... [into even shares to be
distributed, respectively, to Edward's parents, Kathleen's parents,
and] each of Edward and Kathleen's brothers and sisters surviving
the last one of either of us living.0 3
A jointly-executed will is "an arrangement
testamentary in its character, and not intended to operate
except upon the death of one of the parties, and then only
as expressive of the intention of the one dying as to the
posthumous destination of his or her property." 4 The
101. See In re Will of Diez, 50 N.Y. 88, 94 (1872); In re Estate of Zeh, 223
N.E.2d 43 (N.Y. 1966).
102. See, e.g., In re Will of Elwyn, 135 N.Y.S.2d 431, 433 (App. Div. 1954). If
the agreement as expressed in the will is contractual rather than testamentary
in nature, as where a life estate is given to the survivor with remainder over to
named beneficiaries, then the contract is generally enforceable in equity with
respect to the remainder of the property of the first to die. See Rastetter v.
Hoenninger, 108 N.E. 210 (N.Y. 1915). The survivor retains absolute discretion
to alternatively dispose of his individual property by inter vivos transfer or a
later testamentary instrument. Id. at 212.
103. See Petitioner's Statement in Support of Motion for Permission to
Appeal at 7, In re Estates of Covert, 717 N.Y.S.2d 392 (App. Div. 2000) (No. 98-
0329).
104. In re Will of Diez, 50 N.Y. at 93-94 (1872).
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testamentary character of a will distinguishes it from a
contract, which is intended to pass an interest in property
before the donor's death, even if absolute enjoyment of the
property is postponed until death, or conditioned on the
donee's survivorship.' The instrument executed by Edward
and Kathleen was clearly testamentary in character: It did
not purport to convey any present interest in the property
to either spouse, nor to deprive either spouse of the absolute
power to dispose of his or her own property during life.' 6
Because this joint will operates as the separate will of
each,'0 7 either Edward or Kathleen could, at any time, have
executed a new will rendering the joint will ineffective as
the will of him or her, respectively.
That the same testamentary instrument purports to
dispose of the assets of both husband and wife at their
respective deaths does not make it invalid.' 9 The will
operates as the separate will of whomever dies first, and
then only as to those provisions which constitute the will at
his or her death."0 Thus, in this case, where Kathleen in
fact predeceased her husband, the only portion of the will
which clearly expresses her testamentary intent-and
which operates as her will-is paragraph Second, which
devises all to Edward.
The slayer rule defeats such an unjust operation of law
and renders the will ineffective to pass title to the slayer."'
However, the question that arises under these facts and the
law governing the operation of joint wills-a question which
the Third Department never directly addressed-is whether
paragraph Fifth of the joint will should be deemed operative
as Kathleen's will, as expressive of her testamentary intent
under the circumstances, or whether her estate passes by
law to her intestate distributees."2
105. Id. at 93; see also Rastetter v. Hoenninger, 108 N.E. at 211.
106. See In re Will of Diez, 50 N.Y. at 93.
107. See id. at 94
108. See In re Estate of Zeh, 223 N.E.2d 43 (N.Y. 1966).
109. In re Will of Diez, 50 N.Y. at 94.
110. Id.
111. Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 189-90 (N.Y. 1889).
112. The condition of survivorship which qualifies the disposition of
Kathleen's estate to Edward is operative despite the failure to provide an
alternative gift to take effect upon a breach of the condition, such as the
homicide, which renders the disposition ineffective to pass title. See N.Y. EST.
POWERS & TRUSTS § 3-3.5 (a) (McKinney 1998). Property not effectively disposed
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The language of paragraph Second devises the property
of the first to die to the survivor "absolutely and without
any limitation or restriction whatsoever.""' Where there is
no definite language in the latter part of the will expressing
an equally clear intention to qualify the meaning of an
"absolute" gift, the instrument cannot constitute an
agreement whereby the survivor becomes bound to dispose
of his or her estate as provided in the joint will."1 Thus,
Edward and Kathleen's will does not constitute a contract
binding the survivor to dispose of his or her estate in the
manner provided in paragraph Fifth.1 5  The Third
Department, by deeming Kathleen fictitious survivor,
implicitly decided that paragraph Fifth would operate as
Kathleen's will. Yet there is no reason in law to do so,
where Kathleen was not bound to dispose of her estate in
the manner provided for the survivor. Nor is there reason in
law to presume that she intended to dispose of her estate in
the manner provided by paragraph Fifth, when she was not
in fact the survivor.
Paragraph Fifth of the couple's will is operative only as
to the survivor, and then only in the absence of a later
instrument by him making an alternate disposition of the
property."6 Thus, the law governing joint wills preserves for
the survivor the right to dispose of his estate however he
sees fit. Preserving this opportunity for the survivor fulfills
"[tihe purpose of [the laws of succession] to enable testators
to dispose of their estates to the objects of their bounty at
death."" 7 Edward himself, as factual survivor, retained the
right to make an alternate disposition of his estate."8 By
committing suicide, Edward chose to die with the
testamentary scheme of the survivor as contemplated in the
of by will passes intestate. See N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 103(28) (McKinney
1994).
113. Petitioner's Statement in Support of Motion for Permission to Appeal
at 7, In re Estates of Covert, 717 N.Y.S.2d 392 (App. Div. 2000) (No. 98-0329);
supra text accompanying note 103.
114. In re Estate of Zeh, 223 N.E.2d 43, 44 (N.Y. 1966).
115. See id.
116. See id.; In re Will of Elwyn, 135 N.Y.S.2d 431, 433 (App. Div. 1954).
117. Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 189 (N.Y. 1889).
118. Edward's estate would consist of whatever property he had at his
death, see N.Y. EST. PowERS & TRUSTS § 3-3.1 (McKinney 1998), which would
include all property except that which he would receive from his victim but for
the slayer rule.
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couple's joint will in place."9 Kathleen wasn't given that
choice.
In light of the circumstances under which Kathleen was
deprived of the opportunity to make an estate plan
alternate to that of paragraph Second, equity intervenes to
prevent a distribution of her property by operation of law to
Edward's estate.' It is no less true that Edward deprived
Kathleen of the ability to make an estate plan alternate to
paragraph Fifth of the couple's joint will. But paragraph
Fifth as to Kathleen was expressly conditioned on her
survivorship-a condition which was not met, because she
was murdered. The provision in the will distributing of the
survivor's estate became inoperative, as to her, at her
death.'21
Thus, the issue before the court in this case should have
been: '22 Is precluding Edward's estate from succeeding to
Kathleen's property under her will and distributing
Kathleen's estate to her parents, her intestate
distributees, ' enough to "set at naught [the consequences
of this murder] so far as it is humanly possible to
accomplish that result?" 4 Or, alternatively, does equity
further require that paragraph Fifth of her will be deemed
operative upon her death at her husband's hands, so that
her estate may pass to beneficiaries identical to those of her
slayer, the factual survivor?
B. Distribution of the Victim's Estate
1. Determining Distribution. Kathleen's testamentary
scheme as to beneficiaries other than her husband was
likely conditioned on survivorship because she did not
119. See In re Will of Elwyn, 135 N.Y.S.2d at 433.
120. See Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. at 189-90.
121. In re Will of Diez, 50 N.Y. 88 (1872).
122. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS § 3-3.5 (a) (McKinney 1998) (condition
of survivorship is operative despite the failure to provide an alternative gift to
take effect upon a breach of the condition which renders the disposition
ineffective to pass title).
123. See N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 103(28) (McKinney 1994) (property not
effectively disposed of by will passes intestate). Upon Edward's disqualification
as an heir at law, Kathleen would be a decedent survived by parents, no spouse,
and no issue, and her estate would be distributed all to her parents pursuant to
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS § 4-1.1(a)(4) (McKinney 1998).
124. In re Estate of Sparks, 15 N.Y.S.2d 926, 931 (Sur. Ct. 1939).
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contemplate being murdered by her husband.12 Her will
contains no language expressive of her testamentary intent
under such circumstances. In re Estates of Covert held that
Kathleen intended, in conditioning distribution to the
Coverts on her survivorship of Edward, to dispose of all her
property to the Coverts and Millards equally. In contrast,
the presumption in law is that the survivorship condition in
a joint will expresses Kathleen's intention to retain the
right to dispose of it all differently."6
The Third Department's decision to distribute
Kathleen's estate according to the provisions of the
survivor's will is functionally equivalent to allowing the
slayer-who was in fact the one with the opportunity to
make a new will-to control the distribution of Kathleen's
estate. Indeed, extending the fiction of Edward's predecease
so that his property passes through Kathleen's estate to the
Coverts and Millards in equal proportions results in a
distribution of the property indistinguishable from that
which would occur by operation of law, in the absence of the
slayer rule.'27 This obscures the purpose for which the rule
is applied to the slayer's estate: To prevent the slayer from
controlling the disposition of the victim's property through
his own estate plan.'28 As a result, the court's opinion
frames the issue of distribution in terms which render
Kathleen's intent under the circumstances virtually
irrelevant: How should the couple's property be distributed
when the same beneficiaries will take in the same
proportions, regardless of whether they take through the
victim or slayer?29
125. Cf Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. at 189 ("'In order to form a right judgment
whether a case be within the equity of a statute, it is a good way to suppose the
law-maker present and that you have asked him this question: Did you intend
to comprehend this case?'") (quoting 9 Bac. Abr. 248).
126. See In re Will of Elwyn, 135 N.Y.S.2d 431 (App. Div. 1954); cf In re
Will of Diez, 50 N.Y. 88.
127. Without the slayer rule, all Kathleen's property would pass under her
will or by right of survivorship to Edward, Edward's estate would be distributed
to the Millards and Coverts equally after the bequest and devise to Kathleen's
sister were satisfied, and the proceeds of his insurance policies and his
retirement fund would be paid to his alternate beneficiaries. Though the court's
deeming Kathleen fictitious survivor creates a conduit for Edward's property
which ostensibly satisfies equity in allowing the Coverts to take through her
estate, the conduit is more mimicry than equity in this case.
128. See, e.g., Bierbrauer v. Moran, 279 N.Y.S. 176, 179 (App. Div. 1935); cf
Petrie v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 307 N.E.2d 253 (N.Y. 1973).
129. See In re Estates of Covert, 717 N.Y.S.2d 392, 394 (App. Div. 2000).
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The slayer rule is necessary to regulate property
transfers at death by wrongful homicide because homicide
may "frustrate intentions we are otherwise disposed to
honor."'30 The Third Department, without considering the
operation of the joint will, nor inquiring into Kathleen's
intent under the circumstances that rendered it ineffective
to dispose of her property,'' held that Kathleen's intent was
in any event to distribute her estate according to paragraph
Fifth of the joint will' 3' The Surrogate's Court, which made
an independent inquiry into Kathleen's intent under the
circumstances surrounding her death and the execution of
the joint will, determined that Kathleen did not intend to
benefit Edward's family.'33 In light of the facts that
Kathleen intended to change her will before she died,' that
she was deprived of the opportunity to do so by her
husband's heinous act,135 and that the Coverts were not
natural objects of Kathleen's bounty,'36 there appears to be
no reason to extend equity any further than to apply the
slayer rule to bar Edward's succession to Kathleen's
property. Kathleen would not have intended to benefit her
slayer, and both the law and the facts of the case justify a
result which distributes all to her parents as her intestate
distributees, as the alternate estate plan she was deprived
of the opportunity to make herself.'
2. Determining the Estate. Under this analysis of the
impact of the homicide on the joint will and the distribution
of the couple's estates, Kathleen's estate should have
passed to her parents alone, and Edward's estate to the
130. Sherman, supra note 23, at 861.
131. See In re Estate of Kaplan, 267 N.Y.S.2d 345 (Sur. Ct. 1966) (finding
evidence in trust settlement agreement to indicate intent of decedent with
respect to payment of life insurance policy proceeds); In re Will of Wilson, 92
N.W.2d 282, 288 (Wis. 1958) (remanding to trial court for taking of testimony to
determine victim's intent under the circumstances, in order to pass residuary
estate either to beneficiaries under victim's will or to victim's intestate
distributees).
132. See In re Estates of Covert, 717 N.Y.S. at 394.
133. See In re Will of Covert, No. 98-329, at 5-6 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. Dec. 16, 1999).
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.1 (McKinney 1998)
(intestate descent and distribution).
137. Cf In re Will of Byers, 144 N.Y.S.2d 68 (Sur. Ct. 1955) (distributing
victim's property via intestacy rather than to alternate beneficiaries in will).
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Coverts and Millards in equal proportion. 8' Determining
which assets comprise the couple's respective estates now
has meaningful consequences, both under the facts of this
case and to the development of the slayer rule.9 First,
neither the Millards nor Coverts would be in an economic
position identical to that which they would have been in
had Kathleen survived Edward4 ' and the killing not
occurred.'' Second, a failure to determine what property
should pass to Kathleen's parents through her estate would
allow Edward to dispose of Kathleen's estate to his own
beneficiaries. Third, determining the extent of the Edward's
right to any interest in the couple's jointly held property
with right of survivorship would now be unavoidable,
because it is no longer the case that "the husband's
beneficiaries . . . would take through the wife any such
rights of his."'
The composition of the victim's estate is determined by
applying the slayer rule to deny the slayer the benefit of
succeeding to any property that he would otherwise have
received pursuant to the victim's will, the laws of intestacy,
or by right of survivorship.' Applying the slayer rule
pursuant to the analysis in Part IV.C, Kathleen's estate
would be comprised of her individual assets, as well as half
the property held with Edward as joint tenants with right
of survivorship.' Edward's estate would be comprised of
his individual property, as well as half the property held asjoint tenants. 4 The proceeds of Edward's insurance policies
138. See supra text accompanying notes 118-21.
139. But cf. In re Estates of Covert, 717 N.Y.S.2d 392, 395 n.1 (App. Div.
2000). (acknowledging that the court's holdings as to survivorship and
distribution made the issue of forfeiture of slayer's property irrelevant from a
practical standpoint).
140. But cf id. at 394.
141. The fact that the homicide deprives the victim of the opportunity to
make an alternate estate plan is particularly significant in the context of the
joint will, see In re Estate of Zeh, 223 N.E.2d 43 (N.Y. 1966), but also because
the Coverts were not the natural objects of Kathleen's bounty and were only in
affinity to her through her slayer. See infra notes 232-39 and accompanying
text.
142. In re Estates of Covert, 717 N.Y.S.2d at 395 n.1.
143. See, e.g., In re Estate of Macaro, 699 N.Y.S.2d 634 (Sur. Ct. 1999).
144. See infra text accompanying notes 210-20. But cf In re Estates of
Covert, 717 N.Y.S.2d at 395 n.1. (finding it unnecessary to address the issue of
extent of slayer's interest in property held jointly with right of survivorship).
145. But cf. In re Estates of Covert, 717 N.Y.S.2d at 394-95 (holding that all
Edward's separate property passed to Kathleen as fictitious survivor).
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and retirement fund would, consistent with the holding of
the Third Department,'46  be distributed to Edward's
alternate beneficiaries rather than paid to his estate.
147
C. Property Interests Denied the Slayer
1. Use of the Fiction That the Slayer Predeceased His
Victim. Kathleen's estate should have passed to her parents
in intestacy; Edward's estate should have passed under the
will to the Millards and Coverts in equal proportion.
4 1
Under such a determination of the distribution of the
estates, to order that any property of Edward's pass
through Kathleen's estate would indeed "take from him []
property... [rather than] simply hold[] that he shall not
acquire property by his crime."" Thus, the court should
have reached precisely the issue it found irrelevant once it
had deemed Kathleen fictitious survivor: identifying the
property interests of the victim that may be denied the
slayer.
Where a slayer commits suicide shortly after killing his
victim,' the rule applies to prevent the slayer's estate from
succeeding to those interests the slayer would have been
denied had he survived. 52 Else, the slayer would be
permitted to control the disposition of his victim's property
146. See id. at 395.
147. See id. at 396.
148. See supra notes 114-117 and accompanying text.
149. Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (N.Y. 1889).
150. See Fellows, supra note 8, at 505-37.
151. It should come as little surprise that murder/suicide cases usually
involve a husband and wife, and that slayer-husbands are far more numerous
in the case law than are profit-seeking grandsons. Compare Riggs v. Palmer, 22
N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889), with, e.g., Logan v. Whitley, 114 N.Y.S. 255 (App. Div.
1908), and Van Alstyne v. Tufty, 169 N.Y.S. 173 (Sup. Ct. 1918), and Bierbrauer
v. Moran, 279 N.Y.S. 176 (App. Div. 1935), and In re Estates of Pinnock, 371
N.Y.S.2d 797 (Sur. Ct. 1975), and In re Estates of Covert, 717 N.Y.S.2d 392
(App. Div. 2000). From the standpoint of social policy, death should be too high
a price to pay before equity intervenes. See Preble, supra note 19 (arguing and
proposing a statutory model for forfeiture of intestate succession rights in
domestic violence cases).
152. See Logan v. Whitley, 114 N.Y.S. 255 (App. Div. 1908); see also In re
Estate of Pikul, 601 N.Y.S.2d 113 (App. Div. 1993) (slayer died before
sentencing, but rule was applied to his estate).
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though his own estate in accord with his own intent.153 The
rule thus applies to only those interests the slayer is denied
the right to take through his victim, and does not include
his own property.154 For property that the slayer and victim
held with a right of survivorship, courts employ a legal
fiction that the slayer predeceased his victim so that the
slayer does not elevate the nature of his ownership interest
in such property by reason of his right of survivorship.5 '
The fiction is used to identify the property interests that
the rule will deny the slayer or his estate the right to
take.'56 The fiction is unnecessary to facilitate distribution
of the victim's estate once its contents are determined. '57
In this case, however, the court applied the fiction to all
of Edward's property,15 including his separate assets, 59
without considering what interests he ought to be denied.6
153. See Van Alstyne v. Tufty, 169 N.Y.S. 173 (Sup. Ct. 1918); cf. Petrie v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, 307 N.E.2d 253 (N.Y. 1973) (remainder interest in
inter vivos trust cannot pass to slayer's nominee).
154. See, e.g., Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. at 190; cf Thomas v. Evans, 941
S.W.2d 872 (Mo. App. 1997) (denying claim by victim-wife's estate to slayer-
husband's separate property on constitutional grounds); see also Rosemarie
Talio Weber, Thomas v. Evans: A Missed Opportunity to Fully Articulate
Missouri's Slayer Rule in Changing Times, 12 QUINNPIAc PROB. L.J. 361 (1998)
(discussing intersection of marital and property law rights in claim to slayer's
estate by victim's estate in murder/suicide case).
155. See, e.g., In re Estates of Pinnock, 371 N.Y.S.2d 797, 802 (Sur. Ct.
1975); cf In re Estate of Sparks, 15 N.Y.S.2d 926, 930 (Sur. Ct. 1939) ("When a
status of surviving spouse is asserted as basis for claiming legal rights to
property of a deceased, a spouse who has murdered the deceased must be held
not to be a 'surviving spouse' in the statutory sense.... ").
156. See In re Estate of Sparks, 15 N.Y.S.2d at 931 ('This fiction can be
indulged so that the crime of felonious killing is set at naught .... But aside
from this concept of survivorship the argument is fully met by the ruling in
Riggs v. Palmer.").
157. See, e.g., In re Will of Byers, 144 N.Y.S.2d 68 (Sur. Ct. 1955) (finding
fiction necessary to identify portion to be denied slayer, but property may then
be passed without holding to the fiction); cf. N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 2225
(McKinney 1994) (court may under certain circumstances adjudge an absent
beneficiary predeceased without issue); In re Estate of Schrake, 493 N.Y.S.2d
954, 955 (Sur Ct. 1985) ("A SCPA 2225 determination in one estate that a
person predeceased the decedent without issue .... simply involves embracing
a statutorily created presumptive legal fiction for the limited purpose of
facilitating the distribution of the estate at issue.").
158. See In re Estates of Covert, 717 N.Y.S.2d 392, 395 (App. Div. 2000),
leave to appeal granted, 751 N.E.2d 945 (N.Y. 2001).
159. The court ordered the proceeds of Edward's insurance policies and his
retirement fund to be paid directly to his alternate beneficiaries. See id. at 395-
96.
160. See id. at 395.
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The court claimed that such a broad application of the
predecease fiction was necessary to effectuate Kathleen's
testamentary scheme,'61 but this is untenable. First, and
most importantly, Kathleen's testamentary scheme in the
event that she died first (as happened) was to benefit
Edward.'62 Second, even if the court had expressly found
that Kathleen's intent, in the event she failed to meet the
survivorship condition because she was murdered, was still
to distribute her estate in the manner provided for the
survivor of the couple, using a fiction would be entirely
unnecessary to achieve this result.6 ' The Coverts and
Millards, if rightful beneficiaries of both slayer and victim,
could share in equal proportions regardless of the estate
through which they took their shares. '
The court's use of the fiction to pass property owned
outright by Edward to Kathleen's estate misconceives the
relation of the slayer rule to the (collateral) usefulness of
the fiction. 65 In order to do equity, we need first determine
what benefit would otherwise accrue to the slayer or
slayer's estate by right of survivorship to then use the
fiction to deny that benefit.'66 In order to guard the integrity
of laws 6' "passed for the orderly, peaceable, and just
devolution of property,"'68 we need use the fiction only to the
extent that such laws would otherwise "operat[e] in favor of
one who murdered." '69 The court overlooked the fact that
the fiction operates against the slayer only to the extent
that it defeats his right of survivorship. This denies the
161. Id.
162. Id. at 394.
163. See In re Estate of Sparks, 15 N.Y.S.2d 926, 931 (Sur. Ct. 1939); Riggs
v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 190-91 (N.Y. 1889).
164. See In re Estates of Covert, 717 N.Y.S.2d at 395 n.1.
165. See In re Estate of Sparks, 15 N.Y.S.2d at 931; In re Will of Byers, 144
N.Y.S.2d 68, 69-70 (Sur. Ct. 1955).
166. The equitable inquiry at this stage is unconcerned with whether the
slayer and victim have the same beneficiaries or distributees; the object is to
determine what is left to the victim, that we might be in a position to "enable
testators to dispose of their estates to the objects of their bounty at death, and
to carry into effect their final wishes." Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. at 189.
167. See generally Fellows, supra note 8.




slayer a benefit17° which would otherwise accrue to him by
operation of law. "'
Moreover, the court's use of the fiction' enabled it to
reach the conclusion that "it is not necessary for us to
address the issue of forfeiture of the wrongdoer's interests
in jointly held property with right of survivorship." 173 In
fact, when the fiction is properly applied to identify the
interests which should be denied the slayer, the need to
address this question is inescapable. 4 While Edward's
individually owned property should certainly have been
preserved to his estate, whether he could rightfully have
retained any interest in the couple's jointly held property is
less clear.' The court should have addressed the issue of
Edward and Kathleen's respective interests in their jointly
held property to determine to what extent any benefit
might accrue to Edward, by operation of law, as survivor.
To that extent only must it "be presumed by the court that
the victim outlived the killer."
176
2. Slayer's Interest in Jointly Held Property with Right
of Survivorship. The proper treatment of joint tenancies 7 7
under the slayer rule has been the subject of much
controversy amongst legislators, courts, and commentators
alike.'7 ' Even before he kills, a slayer-joint tenant has some
interest in the property:.. an undivided half-interest,"' a
170. See In re Estates of Pinnock, 371 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Sur. Ct. 1975).
171. It does not affect the slayer's right to dispose of any property retained
by his estate as he sees fit. See Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. at 189.
172. See In re Estates of Covert, 717 N.Y.S.2d 392, 394-95 (App. Div. 2000).
173. Id. at 395 n.1.
174. See In re Estate of Mathew, 706 N.Y.S.2d 432 (App. Div. 2000).
175. Compare In re Estate of Liebman, 523 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Sur. Ct. 1987)
(holding that slayer forfeits right to victim's half-interest), with In re Estate of
Sparks, 15 N.Y.S.2d 926 (Sur. Ct. 1939) (holding that slayer forfeits own half-
interest as well as right to succeed to entirety in fee by reason of survivorship).
176. In re Estate of Sparks, 15 N.Y.S.2d at 931.
177. See, e.g., In re Estates of Pinnock, 371 N.Y.S.2d 797, 801 (Sur. Ct. 1975)
("The nature of the tenancy is pertinent since... it must be determined
whether the wrongful act of the malfeasor has altered his property rights so as
to improve his position as a result of the wrongful conduct.").
178. For a thorough overview of the controversy surrounding the application
of the slayer rule to joint tenancies, as well as life insurance, see Fellows supra
note 8, at 514-23. See also William M. McGovern, Jr., Homicide and Succession
to Property, 68 MICH. L. REv. 65, 78-90 (1969).
179. The joint tenant, unlike, for example, a devisee, an heir, or the
contingent beneficiary of a revocable inter vivos trust, has an undivided interest
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unilateral right to severance,"' a right of survivorship. No
jurisdiction permits the slayer to succeed to his victim's
undivided half-interest.'82 Rather, the dispute is over
whether the right of the slayer to his own half-interest is
properly denied,8 ' due to his heinous act.'
A straightforward application of the fiction that the
slayer predeceased the victim would result in the victim's
estate receiving the property in fee.'85 The New York case of
Bierbrauer v. Moran.8 stands for the proposition that equity
requires just such a result."' Bierbrauer addressed the
issue of devolution of jointly held property under the slayer
rule where a husband murdered his wife and committed
suicide, but the order of their deaths could not be
determined.'88 To distribute the jointly held property as
in the property that indefeasibly vests at the creation of the tenancy. The
principle underlying the slayer rule remains the same regardless of the type of
deathtime transfer. See, e.g., Wilson v. Board of Trustees, 246 N.E.2d 701, 703
(Ill. Ct. App. 1969).
180. This discussion assumes that the slayer and victim were the sole joint
tenants, so that each joint tenant's undivided fractional interest in the tenancy
is one-half. The issue of whether a slayer forfeits the right to his undivided
fractional interest would not be altered if there were a third or more joint
tenants.
181. This unilateral right to severance distinguishes a joint tenancy from a
tenancy by the entirety. See In re Estates of Pinnock, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 801.
182. See Fellows, supra note 8, at 510-21.
183. But cf N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.6 (McKinney 1998)
(providing that a slayer-joint tenant convicted of first or second degree murder
is disqualified from receiving any monies from a joint bank account created or
contributed to by his victim, except those which the slayer contributed).
184. Where the slayer does survive, he will normally be allowed to keep at
least his half-interest for life, if not in fee. See Fellows supra note 8, at 514-16.
Where the slayer commits suicide shortly after the killing, the value of any
retained lifetime interest is negligible. Thus, in murder/suicide cases where the
slayer and victim were the only two joint tenants, the options for
disqualification and succession are between (1) allowing the slayer's estate to
retain the slayer's half-interest in fee as though the victim and slayer were
tenants in common, or (2) allowing the victim's estate to succeed to the whole
through a straightforward application of the predecease fiction.
185. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 188 cmt. b (1937).
186. 279 N.Y.S. 176 (App. Div. 1935).
187. "Their deaths, without proof of survivorship, would have resulted, were
it not for the homicide, in a devolution of the property [half to each] .... The
willful killing of the wife by the husband, however, stands in the way of [such a
result]." Id. at 179 (citations omitted).
188. Id. There was ample evidence that the wife survived for some time
after having been beaten and strangled by her husband, and that such acts
ultimately resulted in her death, but no evidence sufficient to determine
survivorship. Id. at 178.
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though the deaths were simultaneous would have resulted
in devolution of the property half to each spouse's estate, as
though held as tenants in common.9 The court found this
result unconscionable because, except for the husband's
wrongful acts, "his wife presumably would have still been
living when he died."' Bierbrauer held that the doctrine of
Riggs v. Palmer9' was applicable to the slayer's estate as
well as the slayer himself,'" and must "stand[] in the way of
[the slayer-husband's] devisee receiving any part of the
property on the basis of the fact that the wife did not
survive her husband."19' The court held that the couple's
jointly held property passed in fee to the heir of the wife.'
The use of the fiction9 . in Bierbrauer was prompted by
the court's inability to ascertain survivorship.' Had the
court determined that the slayer-husband had in fact
predeceased his victim, the fiction would of course have
been unnecessary. Certainly, the potential inequity is
striking where the slayer's distributees may be left
economically better off under an order of simultaneous
death than they would have been were the court able to
determine survivorship. 9' However, the reasoning upon
which the fiction was founded arguably does not match its
result. Bierbrauer held that the fiction is necessary to
preclude the slayer from directing disposition of "any part of
the property on the basis of [survivorship]. ""' Yet neither
the slayer nor the victim needed to meet the condition of
survivorship in order to control the disposition of his or her
189. Id. at 179; cf N.Y. EST. PoWERS & TRUSTS LAWs § 2-1.6(c) (McKinney
1998) (near-simultaneous death statute).
190. Bierbrauer, 279 N.Y.S. at 180.
191. 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889).
192. See Bierbrauer, 279 N.Y.S. at 179.
193. Id.
194. See id.
195. Bierbrauer did not expressly employ a legal fiction, see id., but is
commonly cited as authority for use of the fiction. See, e.g., In re Estate of
Sparks, 15 N.Y.S.2d 926, 931 (Sur. Ct. 1939) (stating that the holding in
Bierbrauer with respect to the joint tenancy produced an effect consistent with
deeming the victim survivor in order that the property would devolve to her in
fee).
196. See Bierbrauer, 279 N.Y.S. at 179.
197. The distributees of the victim in Bierbrauer were not those of her
slayer. See id.; see also In re Estate of Bobula, 19 N.Y.2d 818 (App. Div. 1966)
(achieving a similar result to that in Bierbrauer, but under a binding decree of
simultaneous death; distributees of the victim not those of the slayer).
198. Bierbrauer, 279 N.Y.S. at 179.
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undivided interest.199 The slayer's right to his undivided
interest is independent of his wrongful act, as the
possibility of his ownership is independent of his
survivorship.
2 0 0
The appeal to equity in slayer cases, consistent with
Bierbrauer, is made because equity requires a consideration
of the impact of the homicide on the disposition of
property,2 11 whether or not the order of deaths can be
determined.2  This highlights the concern of New York
courts with ensuring not merely that the slayer (or his
estate) receives no tangible benefit, but also that the slayer
not be allowed to usurp the victim's right to control the
disposition of her property.0 3 Yet the appeal to equity does
not answer the question of what property interests of the
victim are at risk of being given to the slayer to control.
Under Bierbrauer, a legal fiction is employed to prevent the
slayer or his estate from controlling the disposition of
property which, but for the slayer's wrongful act, would
have been the victim's. 24 However, by the same reasoning, a
more equitable2 5 result than that ordered in Bierbrauer is
dictated by the analysis that the Third Department
correctly applied to Edward Covert's insurance policies and
retirement funds, exclusive of his other property.206
In holding that these assets passed to Edward's named
alternate beneficiaries rather than to his estate, the court
relied on the fact that Edward had "an unrestricted right to
name or change the beneficiary on each."2 7 The court
199. "This ability on the part of a tenant to unilaterally extinguish his
cotenant's right of survivorship in one half of the property distinguishes a joint
[tenancy] from a tenancy by the entirety.... " In re Estates of Pinnock, 371
N.Y.S.2d 797, 803 (Sur. Ct. 1975).
200. See id. at 239 ("While a wrongdoer may not benefit from his wrong, the
law does not contemplate the forfeiture of that which is his unrelated to his
wrongful act .... ).
201. See Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 189-91 (N.Y. 1889).
202. The slayer's act makes survivorship unascertainable even where the
order of deaths can be determined. See, e.g., In re Estate of Pikul, 601 N.Y.S.2d
113, 114 (App. Div. 1993).
203. See In re Estates of Dorsey, 613 N.Y.S.2d 335, 336-39 (Sur. Ct. 1994);
see also Fellows, supra note 8, at 505-10.
204. E.g., Bierbrauer, 279 N.Y.S. at 179; In re Estate of Sparks, 15 N.Y.S.2d
926, 931 (Sur. Ct. 1939).
205. See Riggs, 22 N.E. at 190.
206. In re Estates of Covert, 717 N.Y.S.2d 392, 395-96 (App. Div. 2000).
207. The court relied exclusively on this factor, holding that the relationship
of the alternate beneficiaries to the victim was an irrelevant consideration
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rejected the Surrogate Court's reasoning that Edward's
wrongful act was enough to disqualify the alternate
beneficiaries from taking that "which would have rightfully
belonged to Kathleen had not Edward murdered his wife
before committing suicide."2 °  Edward had no need to
commit a wrongful act in order to direct the disposition of
these assets. Denying Edward the right to have these assets
pass to his alternate beneficiaries would be tantamount to
requiring a forfeiture of his unilateral right to change the
beneficiaries at any time.0 9
The same reasoning is applicable to Edward and
Kathleen's jointly-held property.210  Edward had an
unrestricted right to sever the tenancy during the couple's
joint lives. This unilateral right to severance"' is
functionally equivalent to the right to name or change the
beneficiary of a life insurance policy, or a retirement fund.
In Estates of Covert, by directing that the proceeds of these
assets be paid to the alternate beneficiaries rather than to
Edward's estate, the court found that Edward's killing of
Kathleen did not require that he be denied the right to
make an alternate disposition of the proceeds of his
where the property in question "was owned solely by the husband" and with a
unilateral right to change the beneficiaries at any time. Id. at 395.
208. In re Will of Covert, No. 98-329, at 8 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. Dec 16, 1999).
209. The court distinguished the case of Petrie v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
307 N.E.2d 253 (N.Y. 1973), in which a slayer's nominee was precluded from
taking under a victim's irrevocable inter vivos trust. In re Estates of Covert, 717
N.Y.S.2d at 395. Petrie is distinguishable because the slayer was directing
disposition of the victim's property, rather than his own; precluded from taking
under the trust by his act of killing the settlor, he could not then be allowed to
control who would receive the funds in lieu of himself. See id.; Petrie, 307
N.E.2d at 253.
210. See In re Estate of Liebman, 523 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Sur. Ct. 1987).
211. Slayers who hold property with their victim as tenants by the entirety
have no unilateral right of severance, and allowing them to retain more than a
lifetime interest in their share of the property would impermissibly elevate the
nature of their ownership interest. See In re Estates of Pinnock, 371 N.Y.S.2d
797, 801 (Sur. Ct. 1975). However, courts have permitted the slayer to retain a
life estate in half a tenancy by the entirety. See In re Estate of Mathew, 706
N.Y.S.2d 432 (App. Div. 2000); In re Estate of Nicpon, 424 N.Y.S.2d 100, 102
(Sur. Ct. 1975). With respect to tenancies by the entirety in a case of
murder/suicide, determining whether the slayer retains a life interest is
inconsequential. Arguably, courts have taken greater pains to determine the
effect of severability of interests in any property held with right of survivorship
where slayers survive, because the survival of the slayer prompts a more
cautious approach to the forfeiture or diminution of his property rights. See In
re Estates of Dorsey, 613 N.Y.S.2d 335, 337 (Sur. Ct. 1994).
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insurance or retirement fund.212 Just as the court would not
require Edward to forfeit the right to dispose of his property
which he reserved via the power to revoke the designation
in Kathleen's favor, it should not require him to forfeit his
right to sever the joint tenancy and keep half the property
in fee."' To do so would require that the court adopt a
further fiction that Edward died without exercising his
right to defeat Kathleen's survivorship interest.214
Under this analysis, Edward's willful killing of
Kathleen would still result in denying him the right to
succeed to the property in fee. However, by treating the
homicide as an act severing the joint tenancy,215 each half-
212. See In re Estates of Covert, 717 N.Y.S.2d at 395. Professor Wade
proposed that, in the case the decedent-victim was the primary beneficiary on
an insurance policy on the slayer's life, then a statutory slayer law should
provide that "the proceeds shall be paid to the estate of the decedent upon the
death of the slayer, unless the policy names some person other than the slayer
or his estate as alternative beneficiary...." Wade, supra note 42, at 741. This
proposal is unsatisfactory for the same reasons that the Third Department
offers for its holding: As long as the slayer has the right to control the
disposition of the property, it is rightfully his. See In re Estates of Covert, 717
N.Y.S.2d at 395. If the slayer fails to name some person other than his estate as
beneficiary, the proceeds should still pass to his estate, and not to that of his
victim.
213. Professor Fellows argues that where the slayer has the unilateral
power to control a property interest, the victim was not deprived of an
opportunity to change the disposition of property and the survivorship condition
is thus irrelevant. See Fellows, supra note 8, at 510-21. "Survivorship should
not affect this type of property interest because the victim's right to take the
property upon survival of the slayer was subject to the slayer's unfettered
discretion to defeat that right." Id. at 512.
214. See id. at 517 (arguing that "the slayer's right to sever makes the
victim's right to take as survivor no longer relevant when applying the slayer
rule"). Moreover, such a requirement "cannot be reconciled with state law rules
that do not require the slayer to forfeit other types of property interests subject
to the slayer's absolute control." Id. The Third Department's holding as to
Edward's insurance policies and retirement fund highlights this inconsistent
treatment of property rights under the slayer rule.
215. The right of survivorship in a joint tenancy affects the devolution of
property, but not title. If the homicide severs the tenancy, the slayer is not
thereby permitted to "vest himself with title by crime." Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E.
188, 190 (N.Y. 1889). The act of severance is independently significant because
it defeats the joint tenant's survivorship interest in the severer's share.
Tenancies by the entirety deserve a different treatment under the slayer rule
because the tenants have no unilateral right to severance, and the only analog
to a unilateral act of severance is the independently significant act of divorce.
See Fellows, supra note 8, at 518-20. "The right to obtain property rights
through the extraordinary and independently significant measure of divorce is
hardly the equivalent of an unconditional power to revoke." Id. at 520.
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share would be retained by the couple's respective estates
as though held by them as tenants in common. It is
unnecessary to employ the fiction of predecease to
accomplish this result. The slayer rule denies Edward (and
his estate) the right to succeed to Kathleen's individually
owned property, which includes her half-share of the
tenancy in common.
Nor does equity dictate a different outcome.216 The
slayer is no better off than he would have been had his
victim survived to deny him those interests within her
power to deny.217 He receives no profit, tangible or
intangible, from his wrongdoing.2 8 The slayer can be denied
a benefit only to the extent that the victim could have
alternately disposed of her property.219 If the homicide
severs the tenancy, the slayer rule thus applied prevents
the slayer from having any power of disposition over the
victim's property to the extent that the victim could have
made an alternate estate plan during her lifetime.22
D. Honoring the Victim's Intent
The need for a slayer rule to regulate property transfers
at death arises because homicide disrupts the operation of
laws passed for the "orderly peaceable and just devolution
of property"22' and thereby "frustrate[s] intentions [of the
victim-transferor] we are otherwise disposed to honor."22
The rule's purpose is to ameliorate, insofar as possible,22
the effects of the killing-and "this purpose... must be
kept in view"2' by the courts who are charged with applying
the rule. However, effecting a distribution of the victim's
property that is consistent with the equitable under-
pinnings of the slayer rule may require more than a simple
disqualification of the slayer. Although the identification of
property interests to be denied the slayer and his
216. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
217. See Fellows, supra note 8, at 511-12.
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. Because this analysis preserves for the victim the power to dispose at
death of her property to the extent that such power could have been exercised
during life, it is irrelevant whether the victim dies testate or intestate.
221. Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (N.Y. 1889).
222. Sherman, supra note 23, at 861.
223. See In re Estate of Sparks, 15 N.Y.S.2d 926 (Sur. Ct. 1939).
224. Riggs, 22 N.E. at 189.
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subsequent disqualification as a successor to his victim's
property "helps identify the most logical substitute taker or
takers, [the slayer rule] can produce questionable results if
. . . applied without consideration of surrounding
circumstances. 225
Identifying the default distributional scheme which
results from simply disqualifying the slayer as a taker will
often facilitate a distribution of the victim's property that
best furthers her intent under the circumstances. Such
would have been the outcome for Kathleen Covert had the
court considered the impact of the homicide on the
operation of her will, and distributed her estate to her
intestate distributees. But the default distributional
scheme will not be sufficient in all cases to ameliorate the
"untoward effects" 26 of a killing.
What if, with the couple's jointly executed will in place,
Kathleen Covert had in fact survived her husband? Edward
might have chosen to beat and strangle her rather than
shoot her at close range, so that it took some time longer for
her to die than himself.2 7 What if, regardless of whether
Kathleen survived Edward, she and her husband had
executed separate but reciprocal wills? Edward's
disqualification would then have had no effect on the
operation of her will,2' and would thus not by itself be
enough to prevent the Coverts from taking as her alternate
beneficiaries.229
Under either scenario, the facts that Kathleen Covert
intended to have the opportunity to change her estate plan
and was deprived of that opportunity by her slayer would
remain unchanged."' They might still be relevant.
225. Fellows, supra note 8, at 524.
226. Sherman, supra note 23, at 861.
227. "'Moran beat and struck his wife ... and with a cord or a rope around
her neck he dragged her to the bathroom and struck her on the head... Mrs.
Moran with the last mite of her ebbing strength... tried to raise herself up but
was unable to do so and fell back against the door of the bathroom' " where two
days later her body was discovered. Bierbrauer v. Moran, 279 N.Y.S. 176, 178
(App. Div. 1935) (quoting the trial court).
228. Cf In re Estates of Covert, 717 N.Y.S.2d 392, 394-95 (App. Div. 2000).
229. See In re Welch, 252 A.2d 131 (Del. Ch. Ct. 1969) (finding no reason in
equity in a murder/suicide case to impose a constructive trust for the benefit of
the victim's distributees rather than allow her estate to pass to named
charitable organizations designated as alternate beneficiaries under the
couple's reciprocal wills).
230. See In re Will of Covert, No. 98-329 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. Dec. 16, 1999); see
also Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 189 (N.Y. 1889).
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Fortunately, the default distributional scheme is not the
only remedial option available to courts under the common
law rule."'
The Third Department effectively foreclosed any
consideration into its role in furthering Kathleen's
testamentary intent when it deemed Kathleen fictitious
survivor without considering the impact of the homicide on
the operation of her will. 2 Yet even if Kathleen had in fact
survived Edward, 3 the resulting distributional scheme
would merit an inquiry into her probable intent under the
circumstances for the same reasons that the court was
willing to extend the predecease fiction to all of Edward's
property: The disqualification of the slayer failed to
disqualify persons who were also the natural objects of the
slayer's bounty"4 and were in affinity to the victim only
through her relationship to her slayer."
That the slayer's beneficiaries are also alternate
beneficiaries of the victim and only in affinity to the victim
through the slayer should not give rise to a conclusive
presumption that the victim did not intend to benefit those
231. See In re Will of Byers, 144 N.Y.S.2d 68, 70 (Sur. Ct. 1955) (holding
that victim's property would pass in intestacy rather than to two sisters named
as alternate beneficiaries in event of husband-slayer's predecease; though the
sisters would take one-third shares as the victim's distributees, rather than
half-shares under her will, the court found no reason to deprive innocent
distributees of their full intestate share of the victim's estate where the devise to
the sisters was conditioned expressly on the victim's survivorship of her slayer).
232. See In re Estates of Covert, 717 N.Y.S.2d at 394-95.
233. See supra text accompanying notes 227-29.
234. See In re Welch, 252 A.2d at 132-33 (finding no reason to prefer victim's
distributees over named charitable organizations as alternate beneficiaries
under her will in event of husband's predecease).
235. See In re Will of Wilson, 92 N.W.2d 282 (Wis. 1958) (considering how to
dispose of victim's estate where alternate legatees under her will, whose taking
was conditioned on slayer's predecease, were slayer's children from a prior
marriage and victim's intestate distributees were two sisters for whom she had
expressed antipathy; remanding to trial court for taking of testimony to
properly decide how victim's wishes could best be carried out under the
circumstances). If the victim dies without having executed a will, the equity of
the slayer rule offers no possible remedy in the event the victim would have
preferred other persons or organizations over the natural objects of her bounty.
See, e.g., Heinzman v. Mason, 694 N.E.2d 1164 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (property
passed in intestacy to victim's collateral kin, despite a showing that victim had
great affection for husband-slayer's four children from a previous marriage,
whom she had helped raise, and despite the facts that the victim had filed a
petition for dissolution of her marriage and been granted a restraining order
against her slayer just days before her murder).
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persons."  Nonetheless, inquiring into the victim's
testamentary intent 237 under such circumstances should be
a necessary next step in slayer cases, because doing so
acknowledges that the slayer's willful killing of the victim
may have effects which the default distributional scheme
does not adequately address," s but which the court may
remedy by ordering the property to pass by the laws of
intestacy.2"9
In the case of an intentional killing we may usually
infer with confidence that, under the circumstances, the
victim would not intend to benefit her slayer as a
beneficiary under her will or as an intestate successor.24 °
Whether the victim would have intended, even under the
circumstances, to benefit objects of the slayer's bounty at
the expense of her distributees will sometimes be less
236. Generally, such persons should not be disqualified from taking through
the victim, because the victim often would have wanted them to benefit despite
their relationship to the slayer. See, e.g., In re Estates of Dorsey, 613 N.Y.S.2d
335, 338 (Sur. Ct. 1994) (refusing to disqualify persons who were direct
descendants of both perpetrator and victim); cf Fellows, supra note 8, at 523
n.93 (suggesting that the general rule should not mechanically apply when "the
substitute takers under the estate plan are in affinity through the transferor
through the slayer").
237. See In re Will of Wilson, 92 N.W.2d at 288 (remanding to trial court for
taking of testimony as to victim's intent under the circumstances resulting from
her murder); see also In re Will of Byers, 144 N.Y.S.2d 68, 70 (Sur. Ct. 1955).
The court may properly look to interpret the victim's intent where alternative
beneficiaries' taking is conditioned on the slayer's predecease. See In re Will of
Byers, 144 N.Y.S.2d at 70 (finding no reason to deprive innocent distributees of
their full intestate share where alternative beneficiaries' taking was expressly
conditioned on slayer's predecease).
238. Professor Fellows's Model Slayer Rule Statute provides that, when the
laws governing ineffective property transfers (the default property transfer
scheme) are inadequate to address the disposition of failed interests under the
particular circumstances of a killing, the courts may fashion an alternative
distributional scheme. See Fellows, supra note 8, at 554.
239. But see id. at 524 (discussing how intestate distributional schemes by
right of representation may be problematic).
240. This inference may not be made with confidence across the spectrum of
cases to which the slayer rule applies. See Sherman, supra note 23 (assisted
suicide); Berk, supra note 39 (assisted suicide and mercy killing); cf Preble,
supra note 19, at 412-15 (proposing a statutory model for disqualification of
abusers-as opposed to slayers-but only as to victims of domestic violence who
die intestate, so as not to override by statute the possibility that a victim of
domestic violence who executes a will which benefits her abuser did actually
intend to benefit him so long as he did not intentionally and feloniously cause
her death).
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clear.2 4' However, at the point the court addresses
distribution of the respective property interests at stake in
such cases, it should also ask whether the default scheme is
proper in light of surrounding circumstances, or whether
the victim would have intended to die intestate.242 That this
is the duty of New York courts, charged with effecting the
"orderly peaceable and just devolution of property,""3 is no




In In re Estates of Covert the court allowed the
unfortunate circumstances of a murder/suicide drive its
analysis, and failed to carefully consider the respective
roles of equity and property law in applying New York's
slayer rule. The decision, reached by misconceiving the
equitable nature of the slayer rule-and thereby leaving
questions of law unaddressed and unanswered-
undermines the importance of the slayer rule to the law of
property, and the legitimate role equity may play where the
law leaves off.
241. See In re Will of Wilson, 92 N.W.2d at 282 (considering how to dispose
of victim's estate where alternate legatees under her will, whose taking was
conditioned on slayer's predecease, were slayer's children from a prior marriage
and her intestate distributees were two sisters for whom victim had expressed
antipathy).
242. See In re Will of Byers, 144 N.Y.S.2d at 70.
243. See Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (N.Y. 1889).
244. See id.
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